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FUKUSHIMA - THE TRIPLE DISASTER AND ITS TRIPLE LESSONS 
What can be learned about regulation, planning, and communication  
in an unfolding emergency? 
 
On 11 March, 2011 a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the North-eastern coast of the Japanese 
main island of Honshu. Although reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant shut down as 
expected, the 15m tsunami which followed caused a loss of power which disrupted the cooling 
systems. Over the next few days, four of the six reactors experienced catastrophic events, requiring 
the evacuation of plant personnel and residents of nearby villages in a 20km radius. Nuclear 
contamination has continued to hinder clean-up and reconstruction efforts in Fukushima prefecture, 
one of the three worst hit by the tsunami, and it is estimated that the plant itself could take up to 40 
years to decommission. Moreover, subsequent investigations have revealed serious systemic issues 
in the regulation of nuclear power and in the mechanisms for provision of scientific advice to the 
public, policymakers, and to disaster response personnel, which has contributed to a considerable loss 
of public trust in both scientists and the Japanese government. Handling of the ‘triple disaster’, 
therefore, raises important questions for understanding the scale and extent of nuclear contamination 
after accidental release, but also about the need for realistic emergency planning and for consistency, 
accuracy and trust in the dissemination of useful information, not only during an unfolding disaster 
and immediate recovery period, but often for years, even decades, to come.   
 
Background and context   
A technologically advanced but geographically small country with a dense, rapidly-aging and shrinking 
population, in 2011 Japan had 54 nuclear power plants, which provided 29% of its electricity. The 
decision to rely on nuclear energy, taken in the 1950s as part of the Atoms for Peace Program, was 
partly predicated on Japan’s geology, which has only very limited fossil fuel deposits that have never 
been successfully extracted for large scale use, and partly by the desire to pursue a fast path of 
technology-enabled, power-intensive economic growth (Drash 2011).  
As Japan has experienced eight +8 magnitude earthquakes since 1900 (USGS 2012), the safety of the 
nuclear industry has been a key concern. Although the nuclear power plants did not come under threat 
during the 6.9 magnitude Kobe earthquake in 1995, some 5000 people died as buildings collapsed, 
and building codes were significantly strengthened as a result. A Brookings Institution report issued 
five days after the 2011 earthquake concluded that the early-warning system developed in Kobe’s 
aftermath, which stopped trains and sent a local tsunami warning within three minutes of the quake 
hitting land, had functioned well (Kaufmann and Penciakova 2011). All 11 nuclear reactors in the area, 
including those at Fukushima Daiichi, had safely shut down at the first sign of earth movement, as they 
had been designed to do (World Nuclear Association 2014). However, the resulting tsunami 
overwhelmed existing seawalls and spread much further inland than expected, resulting in the vast 
majority of destruction and death (Kaufmann and Penciakova 2011). This flooding caused the backup 
generators for the reactors’ cooling systems to fail.  
A number of factors complicated the response to the nuclear aspect of the triple disaster, from 
unprecedented complexity and inability to access the plant itself to ascertain the damage, to long-
institutionalised practices within the nuclear industry, such as collusion between regulators, electric 
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power companies, scientists and even labour unions in keeping information about nuclear safety 
violations veiled from the public. In part this has been attributed to various factors such as the overly-
close ties between groups and organisations producing lax reporting standards and confused lines of 
responsibility, and involving, for example, exchanges of key safety personnel between regulators and 
electric power companies (shukko), and retirees parachuting from regulatory bodies into executive 
posts in electric power companies (amakudari) (Matanle 2011). These relationships were close 
enough for the term ‘genshiryoku mura’ (nuclear village) to be used to describe the workings of the 
nuclear industry. The report of the National Diet of Japan’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission (formed by statutory law) admitted that the nuclear part of the triple 
disaster was ‘profoundly manmade’ (NAIIC 2012: 9) and recommended that the regulators, the 
operators and the laws governing the nuclear energy sector all be reformed. The government’s own 
Investigation Committee further concluded that TEPCO had failed to prevent the disaster largely 
because it was considered too unlikely to be worth the required investment in time, effort or money 
(ICANPS 2012), despite evidence of earlier destructive tsunamis as recently as 1896 and 1933, and 
Fukushima’s siting directly on the coast. 
 
The dilemma  
The Great East Japan (Tōhoku) Earthquake was a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake which took 
place at 14.46pm JST on Friday 11 March, 2011 approximately 70 miles east of Sendai, Honshu (the 
main island), Japan. The earthquake was the strongest ever recorded in Japan, and the fourth 
strongest world-wide since record-keeping began in 1900 (USGS 2012). Taking place along a 
‘subduction zone’, where two tectonic plates have overlapped and built up enormous stress over time, 
the Pacific plate moved approximately 50 meters west, shifting the island of Honshu 2.4m east and 
tilting the Earth 10cm on its axis (Voigt 2011). However, the majority of the destruction and loss of life 
occurred during the tsunami which followed, which sent waves up to 33 feet and as far as 10km inland 
in Miyagi prefecture (COE-DHMA 2011), as well as across the entire Pacific region. Over 100 
designated evacuation sites were engulfed by the tsunami (Kyodo 2011), and in the direct aftermath 
some 370,000 people were displaced.  
The Government of Japan declared a State of 
Nuclear Emergency on Friday, 11 March, due to 
instability of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant, operated by the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO). The plant is situated 
directly on the Eastern coast of Fukushima 
prefecture, 112 km south of Sendai and 270km 
north of Tokyo, and consists of six reactors, of which 
three had been online at the time of the earthquake. 
Although the reactors had all shut down during the 
earthquake as designed, the earthquake had cut off 
the power supply for the pumps which controlled 
the cooling systems for the reactors, and the back-
up generators had flooded during the tsunami. As 
nuclear fuel requires cooling even when the plant is 
shut down, this was a major concern. A nuclear emergency was immediately declared and residents 
within a 3k radius were evacuated.  
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On Saturday, 12 March, the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) reported that a 
hydrogen explosion at 7.30am had damaged the reactor building at Unit 1, but the primary 
containment vessel had not been breached. Sea water was being injected into the vessel to bring the 
core temperature down. Authorities extended the evacuation to towns within a 20km radius of the 
plants, and distributed units of stable iodine to evacuation centres ‘as a precautionary measure’(COE-
DHMA 2011). On the 13th, a controlled release of vapour into the outer container and sea water 
injection began at Unit 3 in an attempt to lower pressure and cool the reactor and Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Edano admitted that a partial meltdown might be underway. At 11am on Monday, 14 
March, the IAEA reported a similar explosion at the Unit 3 reactor, followed by an explosion at Unit 2 
at 9.14pm which sent a plume of smoke into the air and was deemed to have possibly breached the 
primary containment vessel. A fire at Unit 4 just before midnight appeared to self-extinguish after 
approximately two hours. The IAEA’s 11 March offer of direct support and co-ordination was now 
accepted. 
By the 17th of March, water levels in all the reactors had become a concern, although the situation 
was less critical for Units 5 and 6. There were also serious concerns about the integrity of the cores of 
Units 1, 2 and 3, and water levels and temperatures in the spent nuclear fuel pools at Units 3 and 4. 
An update on 19 March confirmed that at least some of the fuel in Units 1-3 was exposed, and that 
there was white smoke coming from Units 2-4.  Units 5 and 6 were successfully placed into cold 
shutdown on 20 March. By mid-May it was determined that the fuel in Unit 1 had been completely 
uncovered and had probably melted to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel very early in the 
accident. Units 2 and 3 also suffered at least partial meltdown of their cores.  
In the following days high levels of Iodine-131 and Caesium-137 were detected on the ground at a 
number of locations close to the plant, in milk and some vegetables produced in the surrounding 
areas, and at points of the plant where effluent was being discharged into the sea. In April, the IAEA 
concluded that ‘radioactive material from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi plant is gradually spreading 
outside Japan into the global atmosphere but at extremely low concentrations that do not present 
health or transportation safety hazards’ (IAEA 2011). These levels spiked and then began to decline by 
the end of May, which was expected as most of the isotopes detected have a short half-life, however 
evidence of contamination continued to spread. An exclusion area remained, into which some 
evacuees were allowed in order to retrieve belongings after September. Ultimately, the accident was 
declared a level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Score, matched only by Chernobyl, although 
most later estimates place the total release of radioactivity by the Fukushima disaster at 
approximately 10% of scale of Chernobyl.  
As of March 2016, 15,894 deaths were confirmed with 2,561 people still missing, and close to 230,000 
people were still displaced from the region (Japan Times 2016). Almost 130,000 buildings had been 
destroyed and another 1 million were either partially or significantly damaged. A report released by 
IAEA in August 2015 concluded that the nuclear disaster was caused in part by inadequate and poorly-
implemented regulation, weaknesses in plant design and in emergency management, and a general 
assumption that Japan’s nuclear plants were so safe that a major accident could never happen (IAEA 
2015). Although some countries have rolled back their nuclear programmes since, in general civil 
nuclear programmes worldwide have continued under the assumption that the incident was 
exceptional and its results ‘tolerable’ as no one died immediately from exposure to radiation (Downer 
2014: 3). Globally, the industry continues to give assurance that it has increased safety measures as a 
result. However, TEPCO has continued revising its radioactivity data for contaminated groundwater 
upward, and further events, such as Typhoon Etau, which overwhelmed the drainage systems in 
September 2015, have driven radioactive water stored at the plant into the sea (McCurry 2015).  
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At present, decommissioning is still in its early stages, aided by robotics as some of the reactor 
buildings are still too hot to enter. A sea-side impermeable frozen wall has been completed to stem 
seepage and a land-side wall is in progress, as well as extensive waterproof paving to mitigate 
continued contamination by groundwater from the site (METI 2016). In the aftermath of Fukushima, 
all of Japan’s nuclear power plants were shut down for inspection, but so far only 26 have applied to 
resume operations. Four have returned to active duty but there is considerable pressure to speed up 
the pace in light of Japan’s carbon reduction obligations (NEI 2016).  
 
The role of scientific advice 
One significant outcome of the Fukushima disaster was that public trust in scientific knowledge and 
government advice in Japan was seriously undermined (Grimes et al. 2014). Japan did not, at the time, 
have a Chief Scientific Advisor, and although the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Science Council 
of Japan both gave advice to the Cabinet, there were no formal mechanisms in place to channel 
independent scientific advice to the government or the public (Arimoto and Sato 2012). Within a 
febrile atmosphere and under rapidly changing conditions, the Japanese public therefore had to rely 
on media coverage of variable quality and accuracy for information unfiltered by the government or 
TEPCO. For example, television channels’ frequent use of debate style programme formatting meant 
that the public was given widely diverging and conflicting interpretations by experts of the risks and 




The NAIIC (2012) report also points to a situation of distrust between TEPCO’s on-site management, 
the regulatory agencies and the Prime Minister’s office in the initial stages of the event, particularly 
after the latter journeyed to the site to give directions while TEPCO’s CEO was in transit and could not 
be reached. The report suggests that it is likely TEPCO management initially attempted to downplay 
the seriousness of the event because they believed this was what the government wanted, in the 
interval when neither the Prime Minister’s Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, the 
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Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of NISA, nor the Regional Nuclear 
Emergency Response team were functioning as planned.  
Scientific and technical advice was eventually sought from a number of international sources, 
including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US Department of Defence, and the 
World Health Organisation. The IAEA provided daily updates from 11 March until 2 June, tracking the 
progress of containment activities, based on information provided by Japanese sources, in particular 
TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). However, both were deemed by the public 
to have vested interests in protecting the company, the industry, and the country (Shiroyama 2015), 
so that within Japan there was not much confidence in the information coming from these sources or 
from the government. Additionally, as the crisis unfolded, the radiation information released by IAEA 
became too technical for anyone apart from nuclear scientists to understand, and media coverage 
aimed at reassuring the public often included engineers who were unprepared for either the media 
attention or for the kinds of questions about radiation exposure being posed (Oppenheim and Franklin 
2016).  
In the very confusing aftermath of the explosions at Units 1-3, the UK embassy in Tokyo arranged for 
a conference call between UK nationals in Japan and Sir John Beddington, the British government’s 
Chief Science Advisor and chair of the Cabinet Office’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies 
(SAGE), which is convened only in times of extreme emergency (see Beddington 2011; Grimes et al. 
2014; Oppenheim and Franklin 2016). The call appears to have allayed the fears of many UK expats 
then in Japan, who were advised they were in no immediate danger of radioactive contamination as 
long as they remained well outside the evacuation area. Beddington himself was honoured by the 
Japanese Embassy in 2014 for his part in the effort to promote confidence in the Japanese 
Government’s actions (Embassy of Japan 2014). While there were initially plans to create a similar 
system of Chief Scientific Advisors, with the election of a new government this seemed to have stalled 
(Arimoto and Sato 2014). So far, only one science advisor has been appointed, to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAJ 2015). 
One of the key continuing problems has been the gathering and dissemination of useful information 
in languages which are not Japanese, exacerbated by low international collaboration rates and a 
systemic difficulty in working across disciplines in Japan (Sugiyama et al. 2016). Much of what is 
available in English is written for nuclear scientists and is therefore indecipherable for policymakers 
or the general public, while questions about radiation in the exclusion zone only become more crucial 
as time passes, particularly for evacuees who wish to return. Science advice in this instance has often 
been a case of double translation, from the technical into the mundane as well as between Japanese 
and (predominantly) English. The IAEA’s (2015) conclusion that levels are in general safe has been 
contested by Greenpeace (2015) and other organisations, leaving the question of when or whether 
evacuees will be able to return home largely unresolved. In the meantime, new technical problems 
have arisen as the decommissioning operation progresses, such as disposition of 1,000 tanks of 
irradiated water accumulated in the process of cooling the reactors (Mathiesen 2016).  
In addition to physical damage, social and economic damage due to mass evacuation will continue to 
be complicated by Japan’s overall trend of depopulation and migration away from rural areas, which 
had been affecting the Tōhoku region (Matanle 2011). Employment, in particular, has been an ongoing 
concern, as many jobs have now been permanently lost, and those created by reconstruction cannot 
be expected to last (Genda 2011). Disagreement amongst medical researchers makes it difficult to 
predict radiation-related longterm effects (see, for example, Aliyu, et al 2015), while mental and 
physical illness due to the ongoing stress of evacuation has also been observed (Rubin et al. 2012). 
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Fukushima, therefore, represents not only a need for advice from nuclear scientists and health 




This then begs the question of which advice to follow when experts disagree, and which types of 
knowledge to prioritise when academic experts diverge in their consideration of issues and problems 
to resolve. Governments worldwide have also often been accused of choosing to hear only the advice 
that serves ideologically conceived policy, ignoring that which contradicts their worldview, and 
academics who raise a dissenting voice may find promotion is denied - hence concerns about the ways 
that knowledge is interpreted and put to use (Downer 2014), and the potential for regulatory capture 
and marginalisation of nuclear critics (Kingston, 2014). 
 
Wider lessons and insights  
Since 2011, there have been three investigations of the incident, which have come to similar 
conclusions that there had been a culture in which industry representatives successfully lobbied 
regulators to promote their company’s interests over those of the public, resulting in a downplaying 
of risk which ultimately compromised safety (Shiroyama 2015). Introducing new regulation may have 
been seen as a loss of face, an admission that nuclear power was not, in fact, as safe as the government 
and the industry claimed, and therefore lessons from prior earthquakes were not always put into 
practice (Thatcher et al. 2015). These investigations resulted in the separation of NISA from the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the establishment of an independent Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority in September 2012. 
 
The problem of industry lobbying, however, is not confined to Japan. An FOI request for emails 
exchanged between the British government and key players in the nuclear industry in the immediate 
aftermath of Fukushima suggested that there was great concern within the Department for Business, 
8 
 
Skills and Innovation (BIS) about the adverse effect on Britain’s nuclear plans, and BIS was keen to 
develop a ‘joint communications and engagement strategy’ to reassure the British public that nuclear 
power was safe (Edwards 2011).  While the ‘myth of nuclear safety’ may have been stronger in Japan, 
it is not non-existent in other countries, particularly those which have invested in the ‘nuclear 
renaissance’ (World Nuclear Association 2015; Johnson 2015). While Germany decided to phase out 
nuclear power in the wake of Fukushima, and Spain and Switzerland have banned new construction, 
some countries – including the UK and the US – have reinvigorated their programmes, citing superior 
safety regulation, new technology, and the need to transition away from fossil fuels (Johnson 2015). 
These key lessons from Fukushima, namely a need for robust and independent regulation, clear 
protocols in the event of an accident, and experts trained in communicating complex and uncertain 
science to the public, will therefore continue to be of vital importance, particularly in countries 
pursuing civil nuclear power for the first time. 
Finally, there is the question of whether it would be useful to develop formal institutional mechanisms 
for gathering, analysing and filtering scientific knowledge into advice for governments and other 
actors to put into practice. Potential models exist in the form of the UN’s Inter-Governmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), or the UK’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). Five years 
after the Fukushima crisis exposed the fragility of the role of scientific advice in Japan, the country still 
grapples with the question of how to put an effective system in place.  
 
The authors would like to thank Tateo Arimoto and Yasushi Sato for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. 
 
QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION 
 Incidents at the plant were unfolding very quickly in the first days. How soon should scientific 
advisors become involved and with whom? Should their expertise be directed solely at 
decision makers, or do they have a significant role to play with regard to clarifying an unfolding 
situation for the media and the public?  
 How might the international nature of the issue affect the role of the Chief Scientific advisor 
in this case? To what extent might preserving the sovereignty or reputation of the country 
influence the ability to speak freely and to whom? 
 Public trust in risky technology is often predicated on trust in regulatory bodies for setting 
adequate levels for safety and enforcing regulation in the public interest. Regulators, 
however, are also tasked with ensuring that the industry can function economically. To what 
extent can scientific advice help with the setting of reasonable regulatory goals? 
 What kind of science advice will continue be required as evacuated residents return home? 
How should ‘safe’ levels of radiation exposure be communicated and what kind(s) of support 
systems should be in place for continued monitoring of the health of residents and workers, 
without causing undue concern?  
 What mechanisms are required for accurate scientific knowledge and advice to be channelled 
to governments and the public prior to and during emergencies? How should these 








ALIYU, A, EVANGELIOU, N, MOUSSEAU, T, WU, J, and RAMLI, 
A. (2015) An Overview of Current Knowledge 
Concerning the Health and Environmental 
Consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Environment 
International 85: 213–228. 
ARIMOTO, T and SATO, Y. (2012) Rebuilding public trust in 
science for policy-making. Science, 337: 1176–1177. 
ARIMOTO, T and SATO, Y. (2014) Crisis, Renewal and the 
Prospects for Science Advice in Japan. The Guardian, 
28 August. https://www.theguardian.com/science/ 
political-science/2014/aug/29/crisis-renewal-and-the-
prospects-for-science-advice-in-japan. 
BEDDINGTON, J. (2011) Fukushima: Nuclear Response. http:// 
www.uea.ac.uk/~e680/energy/energy_links/nuclear/ 
RoySoc_Fukushima/20110518_Beddington.pdf. 
COE-DHMA. (2011) Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update 
March 14. Center for Excellence in Disaster 




DOWNER, J. (2014) In the Shadow of Tomioka: On the 
Institutional Invisibility of Nuclear Disaster. Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. http://www.lse.ac. 
uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/dp76-downer.pdf 
DRASH, W. (2011) Why Japan Relies on Nuclear Power. 
CNN.com, 11 March. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/03/14/japan.nuclear.history.qa/.  
EDWARDS, R. (2011) Revealed: British Government’s Plan to 
Play down Fukushima. The Guardian, 30 June. 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/ju
n/30/british-government-plan-play-down-fukushima.  
EMBASSY OF JAPAN. (2014) Japanese Government Honours Sir 
John Beddington. http://www.uk.emb-japan.go.jp/ 
en/japanUK/decoration/1404_Beddington.html. 
GENDA, Y. (2011) Future Employment Policy Suggested by 
the Post-Earthquake Response. Japan Labour Review, 
9(4): 86–104. 
GREENPEACE. (2015) Greenpeace Investigation Exposes 
Failure of Fukushima Decontamination Program. 




GRIMES, RW, CHAMBERLAIN, Y, and OKU, A. (2014) The UK 
Response to Fukushima and Anglo-Japanese 
Relations. Science & Diplomacy, 16 June. http:// 
www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/uk-
response-fukushima-and-anglo-japanese-relations. 
IAEA. (2011) Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Information 
Sheet. International Atomic Energy Agency. 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/
fukushima-nuclear-accident-information-sheet.  
IAEA. (2015) The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the 
Director General. International Atomic Energy 
Agency.  http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/ 
IAEABooks/10962/The-Fukushima-Daiichi-Accident. 
ICANPS. (2012) Investigation Committee on the Accident at 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (Executive Summary). http://www. 
cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html. 
THE JAPAN TIMES. (2016). 2,561 still missing five years after 




JOHNSON, K. (2015) Nuclear Renaissance, Redux. Foreign 
Policy, 23 March. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/ 
23/nuclear-renaissance-redux-china-japan-reactors-
fukushima/. 
KAUFMANN, D and PENCIAKOVA, V. (2011) Japan’s Triple 
Disaster: Governance and the Earthquake, Tsunami 
and Nuclear Crises. Brookings Institution, 16 March. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/
03/16-japan-disaster-kaufmann. 
KINGSTON, J. (2014) Mismanaging risk and the Fukushima 
nuclear crisis. In P. Bacon and C. Hobson (eds) 
Human Security And Japan’s Triple Disaster: 
Responding To The 2011 Earthquake, Tsunami And 
Fukushima Nuclear Crisis. London: Routledge. 39-58. 
KYODO. (2011) Tsunami Hit More than 100 Designated 




MATANLE, P. (2011) The Great East Japan Earthquake, 
Tsunami, and Nuclear Meltdown: Towards the 
(re)construction of a Safe, Sustainable, and 
Compassionate Society in Japan’s Shrinking Regions. 
Local Environment, 16(9), 823-847. 
MATHIESEN, K. (2016) Is It Safe to Dump Fukushima Waste 
into the Sea? The Guardian, 13 April. http://www. 
theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/13/is-it-
safe-to-dump-fukushima-waste-into-the-sea. 
MCCURRY, J. (2015) Typhoon Etau: Thousands Evacuated as 




METI. (2016) Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the 
Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Units 1-4, TEPCO. Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/ 
earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/index.html. 
MFAJ. (2015) Press Release: Appointment of a Science and 
Technology Advisor. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 




NAIIC. (2012) The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident Independent Investigation Commission 




NEI. (2016) JAIF Head Calls for Faster Japan Reactor 
Restarts. Nuclear Energy Institute, 21 April. 
http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/Japan-
Nuclear-Update. 
OPPENHEIM, RJ and FRANKLIN, KC. (2016) The Aftermath of the 
Fukushima Daiichi Accident: A Perspective from the 
British Embassy in Tokyo. Clinical Oncology 28(4): 
272–274. 
RUBIN, GJ, AMLOT, R, WESSELY, S, and GREENBERG, N. 
(2012) Anxiety, Distress and Anger among 
British Nationals in Japan Following the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident. British Journal of 
Psychiatry 201(5): 400–407. 
SHIROYAMA, H. (2015) Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan and 
Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. In C. Ahn, 
C. Carson, M. Jensen, K. Juraku and S. Nagasaki (eds.) 
Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Accident. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
SUGIYAMA, M, SAKATA, I, SHIROYAMA, H, YOSHIKAWA, H, and 
TANIGUCHI, T. (2016) Research Management: Five 
Years on from Fukushima. Nature 531(7592): 29–31. 
THATCHER, A, VASCONCELOS, AC, and ELLIS, D. (2015) An 
Investigation into the Impact of Information 
Behaviour on Information Failure: The Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Disaster. International Journal 
of Information Management 35(1): 57–63. 
USGS. (2012) Largest Earthquakes in the World Since 1900. 
US Geological Survey. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ 
earthquakes/world/10_largest_world.php.  
VOIGT, K. (2011) Quake Moved Japan Coast 8 Feet, Shifted 
Earth’s Axis. CNN.com: 20 April. http://edition.cnn. 
com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/12/japan.earthquake.
tsunami.earth/. 











DAUER, LT, ZANZONICO, P, TUTTLE, RM, QUINN, DM, and 
STRAUSS, HW. (2011) The Japanese Tsunami and 
Resulting Nuclear Emergency at the Fukushima 
Daiichi Power Facility: Technical, Radiologic, and 
Response Perspectives. Journal of Nuclear 
Medicine, 52(9): 1423–1432. 
DUFFIELD, JS. (2016) Japanese Energy Policy after 
Fukushima Daiichi: Nuclear Ambivalence. Political 
Science Quarterly 131(1): 133–162. 
KUSHIDA, KE. (2015) The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Station Disaster: Investigating Myth and Reality. 
Social Science Japan Journal 18(2): 276–279. 
LABIB, A and HARRIS, MJ. (2015) Learning How to Learn 
from Failures: The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. 
Engineering Failure Analysis 47: 117–128. 
THOMAS, GA and SYMONDS, P. (2016) Radiation Exposure 
and Health Effects - Is It Time to Reassess the Real 
Consequences? Clinical Oncology 28(4): 231–6. 
TSUBOKURA, M, KATO, S, NIHEI, M, SAKUMA, Y, FURUTANI, T, 
UEHARA, K, SUGIMOTO, A, NOMURA, S, HAYANO, R, KAMI, 
M, WATANOBE, H, and ENDO, Y. (2013) Limited 
Internal Radiation Exposure Associated with 
Resettlements to a Radiation-Contaminated 
Homeland after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Disaster. PLoS ONE 8(12): 1–7. 
UTZ, S, SCHULTZ, F, and GLOCKA, S. (2013) Crisis 
Communication Online: How Medium, Crisis Type 
and Emotions Affected Public Reactions in the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster. Public 
Relations Review 39(1): 40–46. 
ZHENG, J, TAGAMI, K, and UCHIDA, S. (2013) Release of 
Plutonium Isotopes into the Environment from the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: 
What Is Known and What Needs to Be Known. 
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